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ABSTRACT
In this article I will detail the short-comings 
that exist in the cognitive account of the 
emotion objectless fear, principally, though 
not exclusively, as it is presented in the work 
of William Lyons. I will use my critique of 
Lyons’s causal-evaluative theory to act as a point 
of transition or pathway towards Heidegger’s 
description of Angst as it is detailed in Being and 
Time. I argue that objectless fear cannot simply be 
dismissed as a mislabelled mood, as claimed by 
Martha Nussbaum or, as Lyons suggests, that its 
object is merely vague or imponderable. Rather, 
it is my contention that genuine objectless fear 
(or Angst) is best understood as an ontologically 
important means of revealing our authentic and 
inauthentic possibilities.
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1. Introduction
The generic term ‘cognitive theory,’ when 
considered in relation to emotion/mood 
analysis, covers a number of approaches, 
from strong cognitivism such as that 
espoused by Robert Solomon and Martha 
Nussbaum to the weaker hybrid theories of 
William Lyons and Justin Oakley. In Part 
1 of this article I use the cognitive analysis 
of objectless fear as a stalking horse, so 
to speak, to pin-point firstly, the short-
comings of this theory and, secondly, to 
provide a description of Heideggerian 
Angst, an approach that offers a depth 
and coherence which is not to be found 
in cognitive accounts when attempting to 
tackle the question. What is the object of 
objectless fear?
I argue that cognitivists are seriously in 
error when they confuse nescience and near 
nescience in their discussion of objectless 
fear and, though they do not recognise 
it, I explain how their considerations 
come closer to Heidegger’s pre-cognitive 
examination of Angst which I develop 
in Part 2. Throughout I will leave un-
translated the German term Angst in an 
effort to reinforce my move away from the 
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cognitive notion of ‘objectless fear’, a term which is itself often used as an equivalent 
for the English term ‘anxiety’ (a common translation of Angst). I go on to explore how 
Angst, according to Heidegger, acts as a conduit for singular Dasein to overcome its 
quotidian inauthentic mode of Being-in-the-world and how that Angst, at its core, 
stems from the fact that “the world and Dasein are one ... Dasein’s Being-in-the-world 
is … both an in, and a constitution of, the world as such”. (Kelly 1994, 34)
From my description of how primordial, pre-cognitive mood (or attunement/
Befindlichkeit) differs from cognitive awareness, I move on to note how Angst is not 
merely an emotion “aimed out at the world” (Lyons 1980, 104), but rather stems 
from the fact “that in the face of which one has Angst is Being-in-the-world as such” 
(Heidegger 1992, 230), something which reveals its authentic and inauthentic choices. 
I suggest that the fear spoken of by Lyons (and cognitivists more generally), when 
attempting to get to grips with this unique mood is nothing less than the fear of not 
grasping, not being able to grasp the meaning of fear, an ontological fear of having 
forgotten what it is ‘to be’ (Seinsvergessenheit). I reiterate in Part 2 the key point that 
fear was for Heidegger a mood, and moods (as I highlight) are complex affectual 
phenomena in a way that emotions are not, supplying us with a sense of our total 
ontological orientation.
2. Part 1
2.1. Objectless fear and the crucial distinction between nescience and near 
nescience
Thirty years ago the philosopher William Lyons published his book Emotion, a work 
which is credited as having “genuinely broke[n] new ground” (Malpas and Wrathall 
2000, 248). In it, Lyons contends that objectless fear is often used as an:
… exception to the claim that an emotion is based on knowledge or belief 
about properties … Fear and cognate emotions such as fright are usually 
described as evaluating their object, at least in part, as dangerous to the person 
concerned. Now, if this is correct, it would not seem strange for there to be a 
fear which might evaluate one’s very ignorance of the situation, one’s lack of 
knowledge, one’s not knowing anything about the object, as dangerous. Thus 
fear of the dark may not be fear of the absence of light but fear of the absence 
of knowledge or, to put it more exactly, fear arising because one does not know 
what might be out there in the dark and because one thinks that there might 
be something to injure or startle one. My imagination might suggest holes or 
pits to fall into, things to attack or startle, or more ethereal enemies. (Lyons, 
1980, 75, italics mine)
There is a significant and immediate objection which should be raised at this point; 
“[To] not know what might be out there in the dark” is not fear of “one’s not knowing 
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anything about the object”. On the contrary, it is fear stemming from knowledge, 
the elementary knowledge that the dark may hide a foe, as yet undetected, but no 
less threatening, in fact, more threatening perhaps because of that. If one were not to 
know anything whatsoever about an object one would clearly be in a state of nescience 
and, thus, not in a position to appraise one’s knowing nothing as dangerous. Even if 
one allows for mere descriptions of objects, and not objects proper, to be the basis 
for Lyons’s evaluation of danger, one would be faced with the same difficulty. For on 
what would this description be based? Such a descriptive account must be founded on 
something and so cannot be nescient.
David Pugmire’s account of objectless fear mirrors Lyons’s position when it comes to the 
notion of ‘ignorance,’ but is distinct in respect of ‘thought’ or ‘imagination.’ He puts 
forward the idea that the mere “not know[ing]” (i.e. Lyons’s “one’s very ignorance”) is 
what is frightening, rather than one having the thought, or imagining, that there might 
be “something to injure or startle one”. “Looming, strangeness, darkness and so on, 
must be able to frighten autonomously, that is, without being construed as portents 
of danger”. (Pugmire 1998, 39, italics mine) But surely the very reason ‘strangeness’ 
is strange, and ‘looming’ is fear inducing, and the ‘darkness’ scary, is because each 
potentially instil in us a feeling of threat. In other words, “portents of danger” are an 
essential component in these concepts. This point might be made more concrete if 
one considers the example of a grief-stricken person. When Ann dies we do not expect 
to find Alan, her husband, laughing uproariously at a Keystone Cops film, precisely 
because the emotion so construed is of having experienced a profound and irretrievable 
loss, an evaluation that prohibits its opposite, uproarious frivolity or amusement, from 
being felt.1 To say that grief without this cornerstone could still be grief, that is, to say 
one must be able to grieve autonomously, without it being construed as a profound and 
irretrievable loss, seems to be to offer a description of grief that bears no resemblance 
to how we usually/normally understand grief and, thus, for it to be such a unique case 
that it could hardly be said to be grief at all. And in the same way, one might ask, just 
what type of fear or fright is it that Pugmire is describing without it being “construed 
as [a] portent of danger”? In fact, it is my claim, such a description is not fear at all.
In detailing apparent objectless fear it seems fair to say that both Pugmire and Lyons’s 
accounts might more accurately be said to be a description of anxiety, that is, a profound 
sense of unease about something uncertain rather than fear. If one takes Lyons’s “fear of 
the dark” notion and applies it to adults, it raises obvious difficulties. Is it really a case 
of genuine fear for a reasonable adult person to say he or she is afraid without knowing 
anything whatsoever about that which they claim to be afraid of? Or that the imagined 
“holes or pits” or “ethereal enemies” into which they might fall, or by which they might 
be injured, are rational?
Peter Goldie talks of objectless fear in the following way: 
1 Of course, we recognise that different people may express grief in different ways, however, it seems fair to suggest 
that Alan’s behaviour indicates that he has not, in fact, evaluated his wife’s death as a profound and irretrievable loss 
and, as a consequence, his behaviour might well raise questions concerning the sincerity of his proclamation of grief.
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Your fear on waking may have no very specific object – the dark, the shape of 
the curtains, the strange noise which woke you – but it is still an emotional 
experience and not a mood. And the next morning, when your fear is gone 
but you remain anxious, it is natural to say you are anxious about everything 
this morning, or about nothing in particular, or that you are anxious about 
everything and nothing. (Goldie 2000, 17-8)
However, the sources of fear Goldie describes in this passage are not, in fact, objectless. 
For although the examples of being afraid of “the dark” or “strange noises” or “the 
shape of the curtains” may not be particularly well-founded they are, nonetheless, 
sufficiently concrete for us to trace, in a cognitive way, from whence they came. But this 
is not the case for the imaginings described by Lyons; for such a notion to be genuine, 
one’s imagination has to be built on something, yet nescience means to be absolutely 
ignorant, so from where does the object that is evaluated as dangerous appear?
It cannot just be nothing, for what I know nothing about is nothing, not the something 
that fills this nothing gap. “Not knowing anything about the object” does not lead to 
imagined objects but imagined objects may very well fill the gap of my not knowing. 
Yet, such imagined objects must be based on something, for example, childhood 
fantasies or past experiences or knowledge that such things (e.g. “holes or pits”) can 
exist. If, let’s say, I know absolutely nothing about astronomy, let alone black holes, 
I cannot then be afraid of them, rationally, irrationally or any other way. Therefore, 
to literally “not know anything” about something cannot create an evaluation that this 
very state of nescience is dangerous. If it were true that fear of the “absence of light” 
is really fear of the “absence of knowledge”, then, it is not a giant step to suggest that 
such epistemological fear would be my constant occurrent companion. Could not my 
ignorance of great swathes of knowledge produce all manner of objectless fears?
To propose ignorance as the evaluative component of such an emotion is to open 
a door to myriad objectless fears that do not make any sense. The problem here is 
that neither Lyons or Pugmire recognise the importance of distinguishing between 
nescience, that is, literally not knowing anything about something and near nescience, 
that is, knowing only the bare bones or elementary facts about something, on the one 
hand, and irrational fears and genuine, though as yet unexplained, rational objectless 
fear on the other.2
Of course, if children were to report such cases of fear our concerns would be raised 
but not in the manner outlined. We recognise that children are often, for instance, 
irrationally fearful of the dark, imagining all sorts of despicable terrors waiting to attack 
them once asleep. We placate their fears by explaining that the bogeyman does not 
exist in reality or that the likelihood of a black hole gobbling them up is implausible. 
2 Lyons basis his causal-evaluative theory on a fundamentally rational analysis of affective responses, despite the 
obvious limitations and short-comings this creates. To highlight the insights which can be garnered from a concrete 
examination of some irrational emotional reactions see my 2008.  
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In other words, we explain how things really are, their “ignorance of the situation”, 
their “lack of knowledge” is not the foremost source of their emotional state, rather 
it is their imaginations and gullible natures in accepting too earnestly fairytales and 
fantasies. What is crucial here is that one would no more regard an adult’s imagined 
fear of “ethereal enemies” or claims of fear arising from states of nescience as genuinely 
objectless than one would a child’s fear of the bogeyman. Lyons goes on to say:
Because such a fear is not directed at an object, one will not have made any 
judgment explicitly or implicitly about the properties of an object. But equally, 
perhaps, one could say that the fear in such cases is about being totally in the 
dark literally or epistemologically. In consequence, one could say that what 
one fears is the situation of being in no position to cope because one does not 
know what is happening or liable to happen. From here one might be able 
to make out a case that such fear is based on judgments about properties of 
one’s situation, for example that the situation is describable as one which I do 
not know anything about or with which I believe I am unable to cope. (Lyons 
1980, 75, italics mine)
The idea that this type of fear is about being “totally in the dark literally or 
epistemologically”, or that this situation is “describable as one which I do not know 
anything about, or with which I believe I am unable to cope”, raises the question: ‘What 
is it one is not coping with when one does “not know anything about” one’s situation?’ 
It appears that what Lyons is hinting at is, in fact, more in line with an emotion such as 
objectless anxiety, and a description more akin to an example cited by William James:
I went one evening into a dressing-room in the twilight … when suddenly 
there fell upon me without any warning, just as if it came out of the darkness, 
a horrible fear of my own existence … I became a mass of quivering fear. After 
this the universe was changed for me altogether. I awoke morning after 
morning with a horrible dread at the pit of my stomach, and with a sense of the 
insecurity of life that I never knew before. (James 1929, 157, italics mine)
Perhaps recognising an uncomfortable degree of commonality between James’s 
description and his own, Lyons quickly allows for another option:
Alternatively what are often described as cases of objectless fear might be 
better described as cases in which the object is not properly formulable or 
expressible … so-called objectless fears might be cases where one has a vague 
sense of foreboding, a vague feeling that some doom is about to befall one. 
Here the object is just vague rather than absent but it is still an object. (Lyons 
1980, 75-6, italics mine)
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Hanging onto his causal-evaluative theory he finishes:
But even in such cases one presumably has beliefs and makes judgments such 
as ‘There are things out there which make me feel that I’m in danger but I 
cannot adequately describe them’, and these beliefs and judgments are the basis 
of one’s emotions. (Lyons 1980, 76, italics mine)
We have seen that Lyons wishes to draw our attention to a case of fear where no 
judgements (explicitly or implicitly) are made about the properties of an object, yet 
one is overcome with fear. He offers the possibility that in such a case one is “totally in 
the dark literally or epistemologically” and, thus, what one fears is being in no position 
to cope “because one does not know what is happening or liable to happen”. (Lyons 
1980, 75, italics mine) This suggestion allows him to say that, “such fear is based on 
judgments about properties of one’s situation [not of an object per se], for example that 
the situation is … one which I do not know anything about or with which I believe I 
am unable to cope”. (Lyons 1980, 75, italics mine) But how do we reach the position 
that this situation is one that I fear? In fact, the situation would never become one of 
objectlessness, apart from the earlier example given of irrational childhood fears, if it 
were to be understood in purely cognitive terms.3 
Why, for instance, would not knowing something instil such fear, unless there was 
some reason to think that being literally in the dark was dangerous, that is, unless 
there was something we feel endangered by? And if that was the case, such feelings of 
danger must then be object-directed; for example, there must (however paradoxical it 
may sound) be an actual ‘ethereal’ or more tangible enemy such as a night prowler, and 
such a person must be conceived as being possibly outside in the dark waiting to break 
in to my home. Therefore, to be afraid of the dark literally, without an object, would 
be considered irrational while regarding epistemological darkness or nescience as the 
evaluative component of such fear would be equally irrational. Genuine objectless 
fear, I suggest, only becomes meaningful when viewed as an existential or ontological 
concern. Something that fits Henry James Senior’s description more accurately: 
One day towards the close of May, having eaten a comfortable dinner … 
thinking of nothing and feeling only the exhilaration incident to a good 
digestion, when suddenly – in a lightening flash, as it were – ‘fear came upon 
me, and trembling made all my bones shake.’ To all appearances it was a 
perfectly insane and abject terror without ostensible cause. (Dupee, 1951, 71, 
italics mine)
3 The essential point here is that both strong cognitivism (and the hybrid theories) which tend towards an over-
reliance on ‘belief ’ or the idea of ‘vagueness’, are mistaken. I suggest that a widening of the cognitive theory beyond 
beliefs may allow for such cases where X is afraid of Y despite not believing Y to be dangerous (e.g. being afraid of 
Dracula while I watch a horror movie). That is, an emotional response might involve what Pugmire has called, “non-
essential kinds of thought, such as picturing [we might also include imagining and construals], that do not amount to 
belief, [and] may supervene on outright belief ” (1998, 16), as they do, I claim, in examples of emotional responses to 
fictional characters.
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2.2. The causal-evaluative4 Cul-de-sac
Lyons himself hints at something similar to the description offered by Henry James 
Senior when he writes:
For there do seem to be well attested cases of people being afraid or depressed 
but also being unable to pick out anything, real or illusionary, as the particular 
object of the fear or depression. That is, there are cases of emotional states 
which appear to have no focus or target of any sort and so certainly nothing 
which could be called a particular object or target. They are, so to speak, 
emotions aimed out at the world but ones that do not come to rest in any one 
spot or on any one thing (Lyons 1980, 104, italics mine).
To extricate himself from the possibility of contradiction however, Lyons quickly 
reverts to his previous position: “The term [‘particular object’] merely implies that 
the emotional state is about something rather than nothing, though this something 
might be vague, inexpressible, imponderable and the content of a false belief ”. (Lyons 
1980, 105, italics mine), and, “A particular object is not merely just not nothing, it is 
something which can be focussed on sufficiently for one to evaluate it as, say, dangerous or 
futile”. (Lyons 1980, 105, italics mine) By claiming that objectless emotions are really 
just emotions that have vague objects,5 Lyons simply muddies the waters. For as I have 
shown, on the one hand, he asserts that the emotional state is about something, though 
it may be vague or inexpressible or imponderable, while on the other, he contends that 
a particular object is something that “can be focussed on sufficiently for one to evaluate 
it”. (Lyons 1980, 105, italics mine)
But how can something that is imponderable also be focussed on? For imponderable 
surely means incalculable, unthinkable or not capable of being estimated or valued. So 
the ‘something’ that Lyons’s ‘particular object’ is about is incalculable and unthinkable, 
yet it is also something that can be focussed on, and focussed on sufficiently, to be 
evaluated. But how is this possible? The tension is obvious; if something is incalculable 
and unthinkable it cannot also be evaluated, sufficiently or otherwise. Lyons needs 
a foundation on which to build the emotion objectless fear, something that can be 
evaluated but vague and imponderable objects don’t fit the bill and his ambivalent 
comment. “Whether one is to say that there are cases of objectless emotions or merely 
that the object is rather strange, such as one’s ignorance in a given situation, may 
be undecidable”. (Lyons 1980, 76) This reinforces the concerns I have outlined with 
regard to his causal-evaluative theory’s inaccuracy in describing these emotions. 
Paul E. Griffiths mistakenly attributes to Lyons the claim that “clinical depression 
requires the judgement that things are pretty bad. The object of this state is things 
generally”. (Griffiths 1997, 28) But as has been noted, Lyons does not, in fact, go this 
far, saying only that the object is ‘vague’ or ‘inexpressible’ or ‘strange’ which is quite 
different from saying the object is “things generally”. For when something is vague it is 
4    For a more sustained critique of this theory see Sludds 2009.
5 Comparable positions are taken by Goldie 2000, 17-8, and Nussbaum 2001, 69.
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still an object, even if that object is immaterial, “one’s very ignorance of the situation”. 
(Lyons 1980, 76) But when something is “things generally”, it cannot be an object in 
the causal-evaluative sense, for “things generally” is nothing in particular and so can 
be no “particular object”. Of course, if existential-ontological6 anxiety were admitted, 
then, William James’s “horrible fear” or Henry James Senior’s “abject fear” might begin 
to make more sense.
In fact, it is worth drawing attention to the point that the objectless emotion spoken 
of by Griffiths (“things generally”) is more in line with how the cognitivist Martha 
Nussbaum describes the type of grief she felt when:
… moving from Brown University to the University of Chicago … there was 
a good possibility that the object of the grief was a much more vague and 
elusive object, such as “my past” or “the years of my youth”, since I had spent 
twenty-five years living in Cambridge, Massachusetts … This highly general 
object was definitely not in my power to regain … I decided that the past was 
probably the real object of the grief. (Nussbaum 2001, 69)
But no matter how woolly Nussbaum’s object might be, she, like Lyons, Pugmire and 
Goldie tries to force through a contradictory account of objectless emotions, one that 
is, absurdly, object-focused: “emotions always have an object”, she writes, “even if it is 
a vague object; they always invest the object with value, and involve the acceptance of 
beliefs about the object”. (Nussbaum 2001, 133)
Yet, Nussbaum herself appears to recognise that such a stance has problems and quickly 
moves to try to re-label such emotions as moods:
It is very difficult to distinguish an emotion with a vague or highly general 
object from a mood: one may feel generally fearful, and that will be an 
emotion with a vague object, if its content is that some (vague) danger is 
viewed as impending. It will be a mood to the extent that even that type of 
highly general or vague object is absent. (Nussbaum 2001, 133)
This attempt to re-label objectless fear as a mood is a common manoeuvre made by 
cognitivists and one Deigh spots:
6  I use the hyphenated construction ‘existential-ontological’ in order to emphasise that Heidegger was not, though 
often mistakenly labelled as one, an existentialist philosopher. He insisted on understanding Dasein not as it had been 
historically considered as merely ‘existence’, but, rather, the “entity which each of us is himself and which includes 
inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term ‘Dasein’”. (Heidegger 1992, 27) Dasein 
thus draws immediate attention to its location (Being-there or to-be-there) as an entity that finds itself in a particular 
place and not everywhere, not infinite but as a point of reference, ‘there,’ for itself. However, the Da of Dasein is not to 
be understood as designating a simple spatial location, for “Dasein brings its ‘there’ along with it”. (Heidegger 1992, 
171) Dasein’s fundamental and distinctive characteristic is that it has the ability to find Being as an issue for itself, the 
“Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is onto-
logical”. (Heidegger 1992, 32)
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The usual replies from cognitivists … consist in either excluding experiences 
of objectless emotions from the class of emotions proper and placing them in 
some distinct class of mental states, such as moods, or attributing to them a 
subtle or suppressed intentionality, which then explains away their apparent 
objectlessness. (Deigh 1994, 826)
However, apart from the concerns regarding re-labelling affective states, Nussbaum’s 
description of an objectless state is as flawed as the earlier descriptions offered by Pugmire 
and Lyons. For though she speaks of joy, for instance, as being an emotion when it is 
about “how the world is” (Nussbaum 2001, 133, italics mine) she also contends it is a 
mood when it “doesn’t focus on anything” (Nussbaum 2001, 133). But objects that are 
so “highly general” and “vague” such that they are about “how the world is” can hardly 
be said to do anything other than focus on absolutely everything, that is, on absolutely 
nothing in particular. And so we can ask, just what type of fearful emotion is it that 
Nussbaum is writing of that has such an utterly vague sense of danger? If the notion of 
danger is diluted to the point where it is so “highly general” that nothing can be named 
or even hinted at as its object, then, fear seems a rather arbitrary designation. Calling it 
objectless, existential-ontological Angst would, I believe, be more appropriate, for such 
“highly general or vague objects”, such as, “how the world is” or “emotions aimed out at 
the world” are really cases of not knowing anything about the world or what is fearful 
in this most general sort of way. But this “not knowing” is conceptually the very same 
as the nescience I discussed earlier. Being afraid or joyful about everything in general 
is really being afraid or joyful about nothing, for absolutely everything is nothing in 
particular.
As we have seen, the “highly general” object spoken of by Nussbaum is quickly re-
labelled by her a mood when it does not fit the cognitivists’ template. Lyons’s description 
of these emotions being “aimed out at the world” and incorporating everything is akin 
to my discussion of nescience, for absolutely everything is nothing in particular, and so 
cannot be an object in cognitive terms.
 
3. Part 2
3.1. Angst as Dasein’s basic attunement/situatedness7 
William Lyons’s insistence that the objects of objectless emotions are really only 
vague, rather than non-existent, raises the question why he (and theorists like him) do 
not simply reject the notion of objectlessness altogether. It is my claim that genuine 
objectless fear only becomes meaningful when viewed as an existential-ontological 
concern, and it is by looking at Heidegger’s unique interpretation of Angst in Being 
and Time that one can begin to make some significant inroads into acquiring a greater 
7  This is Charles Guignon’s translation of the German word Befindlichkeit, a more successful rending than Macquar-
rie and Robinson’s “state of mind” (Heidegger 1992, 172), which implies a privately accessed mental state, and also the 
very awkward contemporary suggestion of John Haugeland, ‘sofindingness’. (Malpas and Warthall 2000, 51; Dreyfus 
and Hall 1992, 36)
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understanding this enigmatic mood.
For Heidegger, Angst is not fear, not even the vague objectless fear described by 
cognitivists, for unlike fear Angst has no distinct object whatsoever within-the-world 
that is the source of its anxiousness. Angst is not simply an emotion/mood ‘aimed out 
at the world’. Rather it stems from the fact that the “world and Dasein are one … 
Dasein’s Being-in-the world is … both an absorption in, and a constitution of, the 
world as such”. (Kelly 1994, 34) Angst stems from Being-in-the-world as it has already 
been disclosed, “the world as such is that in the face of which one has Angst”. (Heidegger 
1992, 231) 
Angst is a threat to everyday familiarity and comes from Dasein’s projecting ahead into 
possibilities, and the overriding possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein (or 
death) from which it arises. Angst is “characterized by the fact that what threatens is 
nowhere” but this ‘nowhere’ does “not signify nothing” – the threat “is already ‘there’”. 
(Heidegger 1992, 321) Dasein is anxious for itself, and as its everyday existentiell 
concerns and worries dissipate, it is brought to face itself. Dasein is left with something 
essential to consider, for:
Angst individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as ‘solus ipse’. But this 
existential ‘solipsism’ is so far from the displacement of putting an isolated 
subject-Thing into the innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in 
an extreme sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its 
world as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world. 
(Heidegger 1992, 233)
Angst reveals the groundlessness of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, “That in the face of 
which one has Angst [das Wovor der Angst] is Being-in-the-world as such”. (Heidegger 
1992, 230) In other words, Angst-ridden Dasein has an opportunity to ‘see’ itself (how 
it is), feels unsettled and turns for refuge in the ‘they’. But “when Dasein ‘understands’ 
unsettledness … it does so by turning away from it in falling; in this turning-away, the 
‘not-at-home’ gets ‘dimmed down’”. (Heidegger 1992, 234) Dasein is made aware of 
its (ownmost) potentiality-for-Being and its being free to choose itself authentically; 
in such freedom it is given over to itself and is responsible for making something of 
itself. Freedom though is only recognisable because Dasein as Being-in-the-world has 
been delivered over to its potentiality-for-Being in the first place. The very indefinite 
sense which Dasein experiences in Angst brings it closer to the nowhere in not-being-
at-home (Nicht-zuhause-sein). Its focus is, consequently, not out in-the-world or world 
itself but Being-in-the-world as oneself. Dasein is brought back in Angst from its falling 
and absorption in the ‘they’, in its among others conformity, to Dasein as thrown 
individualized Being-in-the-world with an abundance of possibilities or choices and, 
equally, to an awareness of its limited power to fulfil them. Angst is then not felt as 
a response to the end of life but to the true constitution of Dasein’s nullity-ridden 
Being.
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The fundamental mood of Angst makes clear that authenticity and inauthenticity are 
possibilities of Dasein’s Being. Such possibilities reveal themselves as they are and not 
as camouflaged by entities within-the-world of the everyday (Dasein’s usual mode of 
being). Angst discloses and individualises Dasein, revealing the deracinated state of 
human existence, the point at which singular Dasein must address itself authentically 
if it is to find meaning for itself. The sense of unease one experiences Being-in-the-
world (as thrown Being – with the disclosedness of its ‘there’) and, for oneself, is 
the groundless sense of meaninglessness which, in turn, allows for its opposite, the 
clearing to authentic meaning for the first time. If we can overcome our disquiet at 
feeling anxious, we can grasp our mortal existence and take responsibility for ourselves 
genuinely. Being anxious Dasein recognises its alienation in the ‘they’, the upshot of 
which is that it “takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as 
it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted”. 
(Heidegger 1992, 232)
3.2. The ontological insights revealed by Angst
It is my assertion that the fear spoken of as objectless by cognitivists is, in fact, a 
fear of not grasping, the meaning of fear, that is, an existential-ontological fear of 
having rejected or forgotten what it is ‘to be’. Fear that should be remembered was, 
for Heidegger, a mood, and moods, as we have seen, are more all-embracing than 
emotions and supply us with our total orientation, “Moods reveal the co-presence of all 
things in a way more comprehensive than any comprehension, more immediate than 
any perception”. (Dreyfus and Hall 1992, 159) The key point which Haar is directing 
us towards here is that moods are one of our most basic constituent traits, allowing 
us to appreciate our ontological orientation in the world. Along with discourse and 
understanding, moods make up the fundamental existentialia that lie at the heart of all 
Dasein’s other structures. Heidegger’s interest is with those moods that encompass our 
total perspective and not simply our transient passions (i.e. our emotions, our “fleeting 
Experiences” [Heidegger 1992, 390] as he calls them in Being and Time). An effective 
way to view this is to note that for Heidegger attitudes and feelings are the building 
blocks for mood, and emotions are “the precipitating particle[s] that crystallises mood”. 
(Solomon 1977, 130) Though our Being may undergo changes relating to our interests 
and experiences, our mood will not be lost, in fact, if we were ever to be completely 
mood-free, we would also be un-tuned and orientation-less to the world, which would 
make us there-less and, thus, not there-being (Da-sein).
Angst or objectless fear is a mood not simply “aimed out at the world” (Lyons 1980, 
104) or about “how the world is” (Nussbaum 2001, 133) rather, it is the world, it is 
being-there in the face of its own thrownness and situatedness that one experiences 
Angst. It is a threat to everyday familiarity and comes from our projecting ourselves 
ahead into possibilities and the overriding possibility of death from which it stems. 
Death as a constant threat is indefinite and can occur whenever and from wherever, 
from nowhere. Angst is characterized by the fact that what threatens is nowhere. 
But this ‘nowhere’ does not signify nothing, for the threatening is already there, yet 
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nowhere. We are made uneasy not by the ready-to-hand objects in-the-world or by 
others within-the-world; it is these things we retreat to for succour and distraction, 
but by the totality of the no-thing, the something that is the world itself. Dasein is the 
nothingness, the clearing in which things appear, not the things themselves. Others 
enter the clearing more completely if we see them not just as objects-in-the-world but 
as authentic beings.
4. Conclusion
The knowledge that my existence will inevitably end is crucially significant to me in 
my life, yet this significant fact can never be an actuality in my life. Wittgenstein 
reinforces this point when he writes, “Death is not an event in life: we do not live 
to experience death” (Wittgenstein 1992, 72). For me living, death can only be a 
possibility, albeit an ever-present one, and one that overrides all other possibilities. 
Given the forcefulness of this fact, Heidegger explains that we are left with a choice, to 
flee from such recognition or stand up to it. By standing up to it we are made to ask a 
fundamental question:8 In the face of the fact that death is not just the end of Dasein, 
as the death (or more precisely ‘perishing’ [Verenden]) of a dog is the end of its living, 
but a possible way to be, that is, the possibility of no longer-being-able-to-be or “the 
possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein” how, then, can life be meaningful?
It is important, finally, to note that when Lyons wrote of certain cases of fear being 
target-less and “aimed out at the world” he was unwittingly drawing attention to 
something of great importance, “That in the face of which we fear, the ‘fearsome’, is in 
every case something which we encounter within-the-world”. (Heidegger 1992, 179) 
Angst (or objectless fear) discloses “Dasein in the Being of its “there”, even if it does 
so in varying degrees of explicitness”. (Heidegger 1992, 180) Dasein does not find the 
object of objectless fear out in-the-world but as a possibility of Being-in-the-world 
through mood that has already disclosed the world. Those so-called “vague” entities 
within the world, those “not properly formulable” objects that cognitivists wish to 
make explicit and which they attempt to describe as “particular objects” that are the 
basis for objectless fear are of no interest to Heidegger, for it is these very things Dasein 
flees towards: “[Dasein does] not flee in the face of entities within-the-world; these are 
precisely what it flees towards – as entities alongside which our concern, lost in the 
“they” can dwell in tranquillized familiarity”. (Heidegger 1992, 233-4)
 
 
8 Considerations of space mean we cannot, in this article, provide an answer to this question, however, for our 
purposes it is sufficient to register Angst’s crucial role in re-orientating Dasein towards the essential possibility of its 
authenticity.
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